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INTRODUCTION
During the spring 1996 semester, the Jepson School of Leadership Studies offered a
special topics course titled "Leadership in Crisis." The course, co-taught by Dr. Richard
Couto and former Virginia Attorney-General Mary-Sue Terry, intended to "offer students CPR
instruction to sustain organizational and personal vision" (Couto) for a group or organization
dealing with crisis. Members of the class were instructed in crisis taxonomy and
classification, crisis in diverse contexts, crisis management plans, crisis perspectives from both
inside and outside of organizations, and the role of the personal in dealing with crisis. The
faculty instructors determined that although the course had many valuable components and
would be an asset to the Leadership Studies curriculum, the course would be most useful
broken down into elements that could be added into other courses, decision making and
conflict resolution, for example (Couto).
The instructors recognized the importance of the content of this course as crises
situations hit us in many facts of life ranging from personal, to organizational, to national or
world \.vide. It is often through these situations that leaders emerge in our societies and lives
to lead us through these experiences

Thus, this leadership environment as Dr. Couto and

Professor Terry realized, is important to the field of leadership studies as from many of these
situations emerge the leaders of our generations.
Personal experiences in the crisis course awakened this realization of the importance of
crisis research as well as a desire to impact this field of study. This desire met fruition in the
fall of 1996 with the discussion of the Jepson School of Leadership Studies senior thesis.
Because of a strong interest in the material from the Leadership in Crisis course, an initinl
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proposal was created proposing the redesign of the course curriculum for this class. However,
because of numerous ideas, and specific concerns about the course's existing curriculum, one
facet of the material had to be chosen. Under recommendation of Dr. Couto, the decision
was made to extend the work of Michael Helsel, a classmate from the Leadership in Crisis
course. Michael's work involved a paper with a model that measured crisis magnitude.
Specifically, the index measured the actual/potential number of persons affected by a
circumstance to the degree of actual or potential negativity of the same situation. Intrigued
by the model, it was decided that an investigation into model's accuracy and implications
allowed thorough investigation of crisis research and granted an opportunity to contribute to
this field of study. Finally, this investigation allows personal development and understanding
of a phenomenon that proliferates today's world, the world from which our leaders emerge.

LlTF.RATllRE REVIEW

In order to understand the scope of the Helsel model, that is, understand the model's
limitations and the range of its use, an effort must be made to understand the context in
which the model was developed: crisis. This would invoke the determination of the nature
of crisis and the components of this phenomenon. This investigation will address these two
questions with the hope of establishing a framework for defining crisis and assumptions which
may be applied to the .. Scale of Crisis Magnitude"
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What is cr·isis?
In an electronic dictionary search. Miriam-Wesbster's Collegiate Dictionai:y identified
three items relevant to the requested query, crisis. The reference defined a crisis, an identity
crisis, and a midlife crisis. Within the range of the crisis definition, Miriam-Webster
identifies three different contexts of the word, a physiological usage, an environmental usage,
and a point usage (i.e. a point of juncture). Although each of these contexts and definitions
have commonalities in representing crisis as a turning point or decisive moment, this example
from a common reference source demonstrates on a small scale, the complexity of defining a
crisis.
Thomas Kuhn and Patrick Lagadec suggest that in general, crisis is characterized by a
disturbance of a normal course of events or specifically a "technical breakdown of a normal
process" (Kuhn 69). Jack Gottschalk also recognizes this deviance from the norm in a
business context. He states. " In business, a crisis is a situation that, left unaddressed, will
jeopardize the organization's ability to do business normally. The term is used frequently to
describe everything from a nagging problem to a busy day" (Gottschalk 397). Lagadec takes
this concept one step further,r addressing the idea Gottschalk acknowledges: that the term
crisis is becoming a ready-to-use catch-phrase for all problematic situations ( Lagadec 25).
He points out that a deviation from the norm only becomes a crisis once the deviation has
passed a certain limit or an accident occurs in a system that was already unstable or close to a
breaking point. when the event occurred. This limit thus recognizes a differentiation between
normalcy, conventional incidents, and crisis (Lagadec 3 ). Lagadec clarifies the difference
between conventional incidents and crisis by characterizing conventional incidents as:

-A welJ understood event. of limited scale
-Clearly defined emergency procedures
-A limited number of actors
-The organizations involved know one another
-Clear cut roles and responsibilities
-A well acknowledged authority structure
-A situation that is perceived to be manageable
-A breakdown that is quickly brought under control
In contrast to these characteristics, Lagadec also notes factors that characterize a crisis
situation. These factors include:
-A large scale breakdown
-A very destabilizing type of breakdown
-Grave situations that degrade exponentially
-Emergencies that do not play by the rules
-Unknowns
-A growing number of authorities involved
-Critical communications problems
-Huge stakes
-Tl,e issue of time
These distinguishing elements thus make it possible, at a basic level, to distinguish between
normalcy, conventional incidents, and crisis.
The idea that a problem can be distinguished from a crisis brings us back to the
original complexity of defining crisis. This concept will now be examined from the
viewpoints of context and perspective. Although the characteristics which Lagadec describes
to distinguish between normalcy, conventional incidents, and crisis are interdisciplinary, his
work is contextually written for organizations attempting to understand and interpret crisis.
Like Lagadec, the ideas of most individuals regarding crisis are contextual as well. Thus,
many notions and definitions ultimately come together to form the term crisis. For example,
Steve Albrecht states that "A business based crisis is an event specific episode that can make
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or break you, depending upon the size of your company, the number of people you employ,
the products and services you sell, and the resources of people, assets, and money you can
aim at the problem" (Albrecht 7). Here, Albrecht addresses the situational properties of a
business crisis relating that the perspective taken to handle a situation of this context is a high
determinant in the outcome of the crisis. From a scientific viewpoint, Kuhn suggests that
··excepting those that are exclusively instrumental, every problem that normal science sees as
a puzzle can be seen, from another viewpoint, as a counterinstance and thus as a source of
crisis" (Kuhn 79). This idea demonstrates another contextual use of crisis, alfowing one to
see a crisis as an instrument for loosening the rules of normal research to allow change to
occur (80). Other definitions taking a multidiciplinary approach state that... crisis is an aspect
of transformation" (Capra 26), it is .. a warning that a turning point is near .. (Holusha 5), or it
is .. an unstable time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is impending- either one
with the distinct possibility of a highly undesirable outcome or one with the distinct
possibility of a highly desirable and extremely positive outcome'' (Fink 15). These
viewpoints of crisis demonstrate a spectrum of crisis definition grounded on different contexts
and field perspectives. So, beyond identifying a crisis based on its escalation from a
conventional incident, which is itself dependent upon the interpretation of the individuals
involved, it is difficult to pen a concrete definition of a crisis.
Lagadec again recognizes the conceptual diversity of crisis and addresses this
complexity in his work Preventing Chaos In a Crisis. In his chapter ·'Crisis. or the loss of
the reference framework" Lagadec identifies twelve general crisis attributes from the abyss of
crisis definition. In addition, he recognizes crisis characteristics from other disciplines
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including psychology and sociology. These definitions acknowledge characteristics of change.
loss of control, stress and anxiety, inadequate information, and a threat to goals, often
experienced in crisis situations.

The compilation of these characteristics as well as those

distinguishing between conventional incidents and crisis implies the difficulty and perhaps
impossibility of setting a universal definition for the notion of crisis. Thus, the work of
Lagadec as well as the notions expressed in each contextual definition observed above, come
together to comprise the diverse and ma11eable term 'crisis' {Lagadec 30).
Aside from the issue of one common universal definition for crisis, there are two
concepts mentioned but not explored in the literature, crisis as a matter of perspective, and the
possibilities of crisis possessing positive connotations. Several of the authors mentioned
demonstrate through the context in which their work was authored, that the discipline in
which a crisis is researched and defined contains both the author's personal perspective and
also that of their field. In addition, Albrecht mentions the role of perspective in determining
the outcome of a crisis. However, it is important to note that while these authors do not
specifically address crisis as perspective dependent, this idea is implied in crisis literature.
Particularly, it is suggested that the concept of crisis is relative, what may be a crisis for one
is simply a problem for another (Lagadec 4). Lagadec addresses this idea with his
distinguishing characteristics between conventional incidents and crisis. However, taking this
a step further, he does not account for distinguishing between these two incidents based on
the position of people within an organization, an organization within an environment, or a
combination of both. For example, some confrontations escalate into crisis because groups
have learned that the use of crisis�provoking tactics is effective in gaining management
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attention (Lerbinger 6 ). This situation might be a crisis for the management involved, but
only a problem for those higher up, depending upon the perspective. In addition, letting a
crisis occur may actually be in someone's personal best interest or may be in the best interest
of a facet opposing the entity in crisis (Dougherty 8). Thus, a crisis becomes a relative and
highly subjective term that gains meaning through the individual needs of a person or
organization and the environment in which they exist (Littlejohn 8).
The ideas of a provoked crisis, or one in which a group's personal best interest are
involved, are demonstrated in the 1971 Attica State Correctional Facility riots. The crisis at
Attica occurred as a result of minimal response by prison authorities to inmate grievances
regarding overcrowding problems and inadequate facilities. Although initially not intending
to riot, the inmates became incensed though a series of events. rebelled against the authorities.
and took the prison. Their demands in ensuing negotiation, attempted to attain positive
outcomes for their situation, and gain the awareness and support of outside parties to their
conditions. The crisis at Attica unfortunately ended with a hostile retake of the prison by
authorities. However, these events are a good example of the use of crisis by a group
attempting to achieve positive outcomes.
Complicating the understanding of the role of perspective in defining crisis, are the
positive and negative viewpoints of different parties involved in a crisis situation. As Fink
mentions in his definition, a crisis may possess highly desirable or undesirable outcomes (I 5).
This occurs as a crisis represents both dangers and opportunities depending upon the reaction
of the people involved (Antokol 2). Thus, a characteristic of crisis is the event's ability to
create a certain degree of risk and uncertainty (Fink 15). Whether this event is an
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unanticipated opportunity for an entity or a potential for bringing it into disrepute will be an
interpretation of perspective by the individuals involved. In a sense then. a duality occurs in
that a crisis will be fueled by internal energy, that is from the initial catalyst, but the reality
of the situation itself will be related by the outside forces which impact the positive or
negative outcome (Lagadec 21 ).
Within a crisis, it is possible to identify differing crisis types as well as the stages
through which a crisis progresses. Types of crisis are contextually dependent, but like
contextual definitions have commonalities in their defining characteristics. The stages of
crisis differ however, as phases of activity are possible to identify with a large degree of
certain1y

Types or C1·isis
In a sense, types of crisis bring this discussion back to defining what a crisis is, or to
understanding that there are common characteristics among all crisis types (Lagadec 32-2).
These types can be broken down into disciplines, fields, etc. based on the context in which
the crisis occurs. In his book on avoiding chaos in crisis, Lagadec investigates commonalities
in crisis typology characteristics in his discussion of business. corporate, and military crisis.
Lagadec's examination includes the work of Uriel Rosenthal who suggests general guidelines
for typing crisis including:
-the unimaginable crisis requires that we think about what is truly unthinkable
(these are actually very rare)
-the neglected crisis.
-the quasi-una\.'<>idahh: cri.,·is occurs despite attempts at prevention.
-the compulsh•e crisis results from a sort of innate ineptitude on the part of the
relevant actors to manage the crisis (instead. through their actions these actors

help create a crisis situation)
-the wanted crisis, desired by certain actors (such actors are not limited to
Terrorists; they may even include managers themselves)
-the wi!/11/ crisis is apparently secretly desired by all involved.(Lagadec 33)
When compared and contrasted to typologies by Lerbinger and Dougherty the characteristics
of these guidelines make allowances for the simplistic aspects of almost any approach. To
explain, Lerbinger defines four types of crisis:
-Technological crisis - caused by human error or unforeseen side effects in the
equipment and processes designed to produce goods and services
-Confrontational crisis - actions of government or social action groups that
oppose organization policies and behaviors or its employees
-Crisis of malevolence - individual or groups with criminal intent or
malevolence toward the organization
-Crisis of managerial failure - ineptitude, negligence, callousness, or
misconduct (6)
These categories incorporate into Rosenthal's typology based on each category's defining
characteristics. A technical crisis would be a quasi•unavoidable crisis, a confrontational crisis
would fall under a wanted or wilful crisis, a crisis of malevolence would type as a wanted
crisis, and a crisis of managerial failure would type as neglected crisis or a quasi-unavoidable
crisis. Similarly, Dougherty suggests two categories of potential crisis, those that can be
averted and those which can not be averted. This dichotomy divides Rosenthal's guidelines
but successfully incorporates Dougherty's ideology.
A specific typology for universally characterizing crisis is difficult to accomplish
because of the diversity and multidisciplinary nature of crisis and will not be utilized within
the scope of this investigation. Instead, it is possible to create guidelines for classification
which base on characteristics of the event
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Stages of Crisis
The stages of a crisis are possibly one of the more concrete aspects of the concept
itself. This certainty results from the ability to identify the beginning stages or catalytic
events of a crisis, a period of dealing with or experiencing a crisis, as well as the conclusion
or resolution of the situation.

Research shows a strong agreement within this path of

thinking. In the works of Holusha and Fink both a precrisis stage and a conclusion to the
event are identified.However, although these authors possess similarities of thought,
differences are observed in the development of Holusha's model of stages compared to that of
Fink.
Holusha identifies three stages of crisis, the precrisis, crisis, and postcrisis dimensions
which he identifies on a pain curve [Figure I] (Holusha 16). He explains the precrisis stage
as a time of uncertainty marked by the characteristics of nonperformance, denial, and fear or
anger. This period of crisis is not normally seen by the outside world, but a situation is
recognized by invested parties ( 14). A crisis period follows precrisis. This time frame is
characterized by the event itself as well as a type of failure and panic as the climax of the
event occurs ( 19). Finally, the end approaches with a post crisis period. This phase consists
of shock and uncertainty from the proceeding events, but ultimately results in a radical change
of some sort (21 ). This model evaluates the development of the average crisis situation.
However, it perceives a crisis as a negative event, expressing ideas of failure.

FIGURE 1
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Similar to Holusha, Fink examines stages of a crisis, but evaluates the activity

different manner. He sees a crisis as having four distinct phases rather than three:
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-Prodromal crisis stage: precrisis/warning stage
-Acute crisis stage: the point at which some damage has been done (shortest stage)
-Chronic crisis stage: clean-up/post-mortem, time for analysis, recovery (this
stage can be indefinite)
-Crisis resolution stage: fourth and final stage - everything is well again (Fink 20)

The stages Fink describes compare to Holusha excepting the viewpoint which Fink's phases
suggest and the addition of the last phase, crisis resolution. Fink's prodromal stage is

compatible to Holusha's precrisis. The acute stage compares to the crisis stage. Discrepancy
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occurs between these two frameworks though. as Fink breaks Holusha's postcrisis into a
chronic crisis and crisis resolution stage. The question arises though as to whether Fink's
crisis resolution stage is just a signal to the end of crisis or if this stage actually holds
significance in the event itself. The merit of Fink's phases in comparison to those of Holusha
is that Fink's phases make no implications as to the negativity of crisis. The model merely
describes how the event progresses unlike that of Holusha. This discussion thus suggests, that
Fink's phases take a more holistic and encompassing view of the progression of a crisis

Conclusion and Applic:ation
The ideas expressed in this study formulate a conceptual framework in which to view
a crisis situation. Is the situation a normal occurrence, a conventional incident, or a crisis?
From what perspective is the occurrence being evaluated? Through which stage of
development is the crisis currently progressing? Within this framework it is now possible to
evaluate the scope of .. Scale of Crisis magnitude" looking at the models limitations and
applications for the further study of crisis.

METHODOLOGY

This project will explore the scope of the Helsel model of the "Scale of Crisis
Magnitude.. within the conceptual framework of crisis. The investigation will evaluate the
accuracy of how the model currently characterizes crises. the weaknesses in this
characterization, and areas or possibilities for the expansion of the model. Based upon the
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results of this analysis and the components of the conceptual framework, a new model will be
created to facilitate the measurement of crises.
The fundamental elements of this mvestigation are the Helsel "Scale of Crisis
Magnitude" [Figure 2], an index plotting the actual/potential number of persons affected by a
crisis against the degree of actual or potential negativity of the incident, and the Helsel model,
a written explanation. Other sources include course materials from the Leadership and Crisis
class.
A qualitative research approach, based on literature analysis, will be used to determine
the scope of this model.

Specifically, several propositions emerge from crisis research:

At a basic level, it is possible to distinguish between normalcy, conventional
incidents, and crisis.
Crisis is perspective dependent.
Crisis has both positive and negative connotations.
Cnsis occur in distinguishable stages.
These propositions constitute the conceptual framework in which the Helsel scale is evaluated.
The accuracy of the Helsel model will be determined in two ways, that of comparing
11 to its written explanation and that of comparing its measurements against the conceptual
framework of crisis

First, the visual representation will be compared to the written

explanation authored by the model's creator. The correlation of these two sources identifies
the validity of this scale m its own right, that is, measuring the degree of negativity to the
potential number of people involved. Is this model accurately measuring what it intends to?
Second, accuracy will be measured by evaluating this scale by the conceptual framework.
This comparison analyzes the accuracy of the ideas on which the model is based as well as
the structure/organization itself. Understanding this model under these two sets of criteria
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allows for weaknesses to be uncovered and areas of improvement to be noted. Using the
results of this analysis, an attempt will be made to construct a new model for measuring crisis
situations.
The developmental goals of the new crisis model are simplicity and the ability to span
the multidiciplinary facets and infinite interpretations of crisis study. This framework will be
created under two constraints, 1) The new model will contain the elements of the conceptual
framework of crisis and 2) it will consider noted weaknesses of the Helsel model. The model
will be constructed with the knowledge that limitations will occur and that the scale is two
dimensionalizing a dynamic phenomena. Nevertheless, the result should represent an advance
in the understanding of crisis and how one might respond to it. To test the accuracy of the
new model, a case will be applied to the scale, plotting the progression of the crisis situation
to show the event's development and the usage of this instrument for leadership study.

ANALYSIS
11,e Helsel Moc/cl
In a short essay about the "Scale of Crisis Magnitude," [Figure 2J Helsel I describe the
model and its purpose in the classification of different crises. He exp1nins that the model, •· is
a measure of the magnitude of a crisis in terms of the actual or potential number of persons
involved, measured on the y-axis, and the degree of actual or potential negativity, measured
on the x-axis." The categories (y-axis) ranging from personal, to organizational, to regional,
to national, to international, to global, have unclear boundaries which are subjective, based on

'The cxplam1lion of the scale of crisis magnitude wus ,iutlmrcd hy Michael Helsel in conjunclion \\ ith group
members of the Attica project in the Leadership in Crisis course.
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the perspectives of each individual involved in the situation/crisis. The same stipulations are
placed on the factors of the x-axis, discomfort, failure, destruction, and death. Thus, each X
placed on the graph with relationship to the factors on each axis, is not a specific point, but
represents an area that extends in all directions. The semi-circular rings placed on the graph
are labeled as types I-IV respectively. The intent of these rings is to categorize the severity
of the crisis, moving from the inner ring outward.

FIGURE 2

SCALE OF CRISIS MAGNITUDE
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Helsel makes four observations about crisis in relation to his model. These ideas
describe what the model intends to portray in the continuum of Types I-IV
A shift from an internal to an external locus of control. (suggesting with this
terminology that the reality of the crisis becomes defined by the outside
environment as severity increases)
A shift from stakeholder polarization to stakeholder uniformity. (The stakeholders
become more aligned as the severity progress versus further apart \vhen it is
smaller)
Increased media attention, ranging from local to international.
An increasing difficulty resolving the crisis, while a decreasing difficulty
diagnosing the problem or problems contributing to the crisis. (I)
These four observations demonstrate how the severity of crisis increases in each of the four
Type rings on the model.

lmemal A110zrsis: Critique rd the Helsel Model
In comparing the explanation authored by the model's inventors, with the physical
representation, questions arise as to the usability of this scale as it is intended. In particular,
two discrepancies appear, the inability of each y-axis category to be a factor in each of the
four levels of severity for a crisis, and the ambiguity in the correlation of crisis severity Types
I-IV to the fot1r categories of the degree of actual or potential negativity along the x-axis.
Helsel includes Types I-IV in his model to differentiate severity levels of crisis.
However, it is unclear why only the categories of personal and organizational crisis can attain
all four types of crisis severity

The way the model is depicted, a regional crisis must be of

the severity of a Type JI, III, or IV. This suggests that these situations can not be minor at a
regional level. However, the single quadrant format of the model accommodates plotting a
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situation based on a coordinate of discomfort and one of regional

FoHowing this ideology,

the point categorizes as a Type II crisis, although it would only be causing the region
discomfort. National, international, and global crisis are similarly limited. International and
national crisis are depicted as only Type III or IV. Global crisis is only categorized as Type
IV. This discussion then suggests that Helsel draws a correlation between the number of
people affected by an incident and the severity of a crisis. This is supported by the y-axis
categories, actual/potential number of persons affected, that are included within the rings of
Types I-IV Thus, what Helsel implies in explanation and what he depicts visually do not
maintain a correlation.
The second discrepancy observed with this model is a perplexity in the connection of
Types I-IV to the four categories along the x-axis, discomfort, failure, destruction, and death.
The visual presentation of the model implies that these negative consequences are the degree
of severity to be expected in the corresponding level of crisis. It is unclear though, whether
this assumption is correct in light of the inability of the all y-axis categories to participate in
all four x�axis categories. Thus, an analysis of the Helsel model, comparing the visual
depiction with the written explanation yields a discrepancy in how the rings are laid out v. the
plotting of examples based on the x and y axis. This structural analysis of the "Scale of
Crisis Magnitude" tests the internal accuracy of the model: the correlation of the model's
visual representation and written explanation. Also imperative to this investigation is an
analysis of the content measure of the model against the conceptual framework established for
CflSIS.
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External Analysis: Application of the Conceptual Fr-amework to rhe Helsel Model
The conceptual framework for this analysis is understood to encompass the following
propositions:
At a basic level, it is possible to distinguish between normalcy. conventional
incidents, and crisis.
Crisis is perspective dependent
Crisis has both positive and negative connotations
Crisis occurs in distinguishable stages.
This analysis will consider the accuracy of the Helsel model in light of each of the
propositions. Does the model contain these elements, are they implied, suggested?
Proposition ff!: At a basic level, it is
incidents, and crisis

possible lo

distinguish

behYeen normak')1,

conventional

The first proposition tests the accuracy of the "Scale of Crisis Magnitude,. based on

the model's distinction between normalcy, conventional incidents and crisis. The structure of
this model portrays two different approaches to measuring crises, measuring crisis by its
severity as accomplished by the Type I-IV rings, and measuring crisis through plotting
coordinates of magnitude on they and x axes. The rings on the model categorize the severity
of crisis: the categories they contain increase in severity as they move outward on the scale
This measurement relates to proposition one, as the measurement of the rings could be related
to the increase of situational severity as an event moves from a critical incident to a crisis.
Specifically, a "flat tire" is placed within the first ring on the model. Depending upon
perspective and situational factors, this event could categorize as a critical incident. Like the
rings, the measurement by the axes suggest study of the magnitude of situations. In particular,
this is observed in the x-axis categories; discomfort, failure, destruction, and death. The
measurement of the x-axis correlates to proposition one as the degree of actual or potential
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negativity increases along the continuum. The initial measurement of discomfort also holds
potential correlation with a critical incident as this measurement only suggests a possible
threat to a normal situation. Both measurement approaches of this model, the rings and the x
axis, contain a correlation between a separation between conventional incidents and crisis.
However, because this separation is implied and not well distinguished from a crisis situation
on the Helsel model, it is concluded that the 11 Scale of Crisis Magnitude" does not
substantially support proposition one.

Pmpo.\·ihon 11 2: Crisis is perspective dependent
The second proposition examines the accuracy of the Helsel model in the light of
crisis as perspective dependent This assumption is supported by the Helsel model: in the
model's written explanation. This description states that the "Scale of Crisis Magnitude" was
constructed in the knowledge that the placement of each X on the graph is based on the
perspectives of the model's user. Thus, although perspective is not depicted in the visual
representntion of the Helsel model, perception is recognized as an accurate attribute of this
model.

Proposition :. 3: Crisis has hoth positfre and negative c:onnotations
The third aspect of the framework in which to consider the Helsel model is the
proposition that crisis has both positive and negative connotations. The "Scale of Crisis
Magnitude" suggests that a crisis has a negative outcome. This statement bases on the label
of the x-axis, "Degree of Actual or Potential Negativity." Although it is understood that the
model attempts to accomplish an understanding of the situation or what might negatively
happen as a result of circumstances based on the number of people involved, some viewpoints

20
interpret crisis as positive. Thus, negative measurements of a situation limit this scale
because they do not allow for positive situational outcomes or for changes in situation. All
crisis do not end in failure, destruction, or death as implied by the scale. The discomfort
factor on the x-axis grants leeway from the negative connotation of this model in that
discomfort can be a factor of a change process or of a situation with a positive outcome.
However, this observation is not substantiated with fact, nor is it discussed or used in a
positive manner in the application of the Helsel model. Thus, the conclusion is drawn that
the Helsel model only considers negative crisis situations in its measurement.

Proposition :! -I: Crisis occurs in distinguishable stages
Finally. the accuracy of the Helsel model is investigated in light of crisis occurring in
distinguishable stages. As implied by the stages of crisis, prodroma!, acute, chronic, and
resolution, each stage has different levels of momentum and different circumstances are
happe11ing at different times. These stages suggest the dynamic nature of the phenomenon.
Through the rings, the Helsel model demonstrates the severity of crisis. The categories of the
x-axis allow the examination of crisis at different levels of negative outcome, discomfort,
failure, destruction, and death. ln spite of these classifications of a crisis situation, neither the
rings, nor the x-axis factors refer to the stages of crisis development. References are only
made for the observation of crisis progression toward negative outcomes, with no allowances
for the restoration to normalcy (pre-prodromal) or movement towards resolution, factors of the
stages of crisis. Thus, the deduction is made that the Helsel scale does not consider the
stages of crisis in its measurement of the phenomenon.
This analysis of the Helsel "Scale of Crisis Magnitude" suggests that the Helsel model
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does not accurately depict in the visual representation what is inferred by Helsel's own written
explanation, nor does it take into account the criteria of the conceptual model proposed in this
paper. It does not distinguish between normalcy, conventional incidents, and crisis, the model
does not consider both the positive and negative connotations associated with crisis situations,
and it does

not account for the distinguishable stages of crisis. The positive merit of this

model which gives credibility to the model's accuracy, is its claim of observation of
perspective. These findings in addition to the crisis factual framework are the backbone on
which a new model to measure crisis is based.

TRUDEL MODEL
The analysis of the "Scale of Crisis Magnitude" concluded that the Helsel model, the
visual depiction of the "Scale of Crisis Magnitude," is neither accurate nor usable. A new
model was thus designed that is accurate and usable across contexts. [Figure 3]
The new model measures the Center of Situational Control (CSC), y-axis, against the
Degree/Nature of Threat, x-axis, in any given situation. The CSC derives from the ideology
of Locus of Control (LOC) expressed in the Helsel model. Helsel uses the term LOC to
describe the severity of a crisis situation. He describes this occurrence as happening as a shift
is made in a situation from an internal to an external LOC, which in his model occurs as a
situation moves though the continuum of Types I-IV [Figure 2]. However, this usage of the
term is incorrect as the LOC is understood to imply a "self-assessment instrument to
discriminate between people who feel their destiny is determined primarily by external
forces ... and people who feel their destiny is largely determined by internal forces" (Curphy
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154). Thus, the idea behind the CSC incorporates the premise of LOC, internal and external
control centers, and Helsel's idea that internal and external do not mean personal control
influences, but different control environments which interact with one another in a crisis
situation. So for the purpose of this model, the CSC (y-axis) acts to offer a range to identify
the center of control in any situation. The control center has two components, an internal
CSC and an external CSC. The internal CSC gradually diminishes up the continuum of the
y-axis. In contrast, the external CSC increases up the y-axis. Obviously, external increases
as internal decreases. The CSC's are presented separately however, to suggest the different
participants in a crisis. Lagadec and Littlejohn suggest the utility of this double focus. In his
description of the duality of crisis, Lagadec suggests that "crisis is fueled by internal energy
but the reality of the situation is created by outside forces" (Lagadec 21). Similarly,
Littlejohn notes that crisis "gains meaning through the individual needs of an organization and
the environment in which the organization exists" (Littlejohn 8). These ideologies
demonstrate the interaction of the internal and external environments which the Trudel model
depicts. This suggests then, that a crisis is determined by the perspectives of the individuals
involved, specifically, the individuals of an organization involved in the crisis and those
individuals and groups of the organization ·s environment. These ideas thus form the ground
for the creation of the continuum on the y-axis of the new index.
The Degree/Nature of Threat on the x-axis measures the threat to normalcy/stasis
ranging to a threat to life. Similar to the depiction of categories in the Helsel model, these
categories which set constraints on the beginning and the end of a situation have unclear
boundaries as well as unclear middle ground. The Degree/Nature of Threat relates to the

2-1
stages of crisis, prodromaJ, acute. chronic, and resolution. with connections drawn between
the conventional incident and prodromal stage. On this x-axis we omit normalcy, and note
the distinction between a conventional incident and a crisis.
This model is intended for use in two capacities, understanding the implications and
circumstances of one crisis and evaluating several crisis. First, the model allows the user to
categorize the perceptions and involvement of one crisis and to understand the relationships
between the parties involved. This capacity of the model considers the dynamic nature of a
conventional incident or crisis and allows the user to plot the movement as crisis progresses
or as relationships between entities involved become interdependent. [Figure 5] Because the
severity of crisis is lesser with an internal CSC, the idea this index promotes is the reduction
of the external CSC and in tum the threat to life in order to make the crisis more controllable
and to bring it back down into the realm of a conventional incident. To accomplish this
intent, the index facilitates the use of external factors to help refocus the CSC internally or to
show how the whole thing becomes uncontrollable.
The second way to use this model is to plot the relationships of several crisis.
[Figure 4] Here however a spiral is used instead of a point to mark the situation's place on
the index. This spiral accommodates the dynamic nature of a crisis and demonstrates how the
situation can potentially shift as the situation changes versus a plot mark which implies
permanency.
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AjJp/icarion of the Conceptual Framework lo the T111del Model
The conceptual framework of this investigation is one of two constraints under which
the Trudel model was developed. As with the Helsel model, this new scale will be analyzed
based on these four propositions.

Proposition ;; 1: At a basic level, it is possible to dis,;nguish between normalcy, com·enrional
incidents, and crisis.
The first aspect of the conceptual framework questions the Trudel model's

acknowledgement of the differences between normalcy, conventional incidents, and crisis
The way that the Trudel model is depicted, the x-axis, measuring the degree/nature of threat,
assumes that a situation is in the realm of a conventional incident Normalcy is omitted from
this diagram as it is everyday. Although we measure crisis by this model, the point at which
a shift occurs between a critical incident and a crisis is not depicted here. It is an unknown at
this time. The stages of crisis listed beneath the x-axis however, give an idea of how the
stages might correlate with the degree/nature of threat, creating a guide for plotting the events
of a situation. This is only a guide though, as the actual parallel of these two measurements
is unknown. Thus, the Trudel model does consider the differences between normalcy and a
conventional incident. The model however does relates an understanding of the difference
between a conventional incident and crisis, but this difference is not depicted on the model at
this time.

l'roposilion !: 2: Cri -; · is perspecli1•c depenclen/
The second aspect of the conceptual framework, crisis is perspective dependent,
applies to the this model. When plotting the CSC against the Degree/Nature of threat, it is
the perspective of the model's user that determines the location of the placemarker. Thus, for
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each user of the model, the progression of one situation may be plotted in several different
ways. Similarly, plotting several crises would most likely produce several different
interpretations. This ability to record preconceptions a strength of this model as So, although
the importance of perception is not stated on the model, it is an integral aspect of the Trudel
model.
Proposition �3: Crisfa· has hnth positive and negative connotations.

The next test of the Trudel model is its accommodation of both positive and negative
connotations of crisis. This model facilitates this aspect of the conceptual framework as it
places no restrictions on either viewpoint. Unlike the Helsel model which measures the
Degree of Actual/Potential Negativity, the x-axis of the Trudel model measures the
Degree/Nature of Threat to any situation. This measurement looks at what could occur, but
the events themselves dictate where they fall on the continuum. Thus, this model allows for
an event to conclude under positive circumstances, but holds no restrictions for those which
are negative.
Propo.\·ition !: -I:

Crixis m:c:urs in distinguishahle stages.

Finally, this model can be examined in light of the fourth proposition: crisis occurs in
distinguishable stages. This application of the conceptual framework to the Trudel model
brings to light two weakness of this model, specifically in the description of the x-axis. First,
a correlation is implied between the stages of crisis and the measured range of the x-axis.
However, because this index measures the activity of a crisis, the chronic stage cannot be
measured on this graph by location in the same manner in which the prodromal or acute stage
can be marked.

The second weakness of this model is its inability to assume that the acute
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stage of a crisis is the circumstance which bridges the gap between a conventional incident
and a crisis. To address these deficiencies of the index, the stages of crisis are drawn paraHel
to the x-axis on the index. The notation of these stages attempts to show the correlation
between these two categorizations, but demonstrates their incompatibility
These correlation of these four propositions to the Trudel model il1ustrates the role
which this conceptual framework played in the model's development. Although the model
can not support every aspect of the framework, these weaknesses are acknowledged and
recognized as a future area for the model's improvement.

TRUDEL MODEL APPLICATION
To provide a more comprehensive understanding of the Trudel model, the following
case, originally plotted on the "Scale of Crisis Magnitude, will be applied to the Trudel
model and the thought process behind this application explained.

Cose. Aflirn S1a1c Corrcdionaf Fac:ilily
The Attica State Correctional Facility, a maximum security prison located in upstate
New York. became the center of the nation's focus in the fall of I 971. Through a series of
circumstances and actions by authorities and inmates from July through September, a crisis
occurred resulting in 39 deaths and 91 woundings (Wicker 314).
In July 1971 New York's Commissioner of Correctional Services, Russell G. Oswald
received a petition from the "Attica Liberation Faction," a group of inmates claiming brutal
and dehumanizing conditions at the state facility (6). Already concerned about tight budgets
and prison unrest in Attica and other facilities, this correspondence by the convicts began a
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futile exchange of letters between Oswald and the faction (6) confirming the fears of Oswald
and Attica prison authorities which increased over the next several months. The fruitlessness
of the inmates' efforts in their appeal to prison authorities, was confirmed in their minds again
in early September when Oswald, Attica's Superintendent, Mancusi, and a prisoner
representative met to discuss issues from the Liberation Faction's petition. The negotiation
resulted in promised changes by Oswald, but again no action was seen (311 ). In retrospect,
the interactions between authorities and inmates functioned to build tension and unrest
between the two groups and established a common ground on which the inmates united.
The build up of tension among the inmates in Attica increased in September 1971.
Late on a Wednesday afternoon, a guard misperceived the interaction of two inmates during
recreation time, leading to physical defiance to the guards by both inmates (Clines I). The
guards, who retreated at the time, retaliated later in the evening under the direction of
Mancusi, by beating the prisoners and placing them in solital)' confinement (Wicker 311 ).
Enraged by the perceived injustice to their comrades the night before, the A block prisoners
liberated a third prisoner involved in the preceding day's events on their way to breakfast
early Thursday morning. Finding the inmate gone, the authorities approached the line of
prisoners on the way back from the meal. ln the ensuing struggle, the Lieutenant in charge
was knocked unconscious and the others guards with the inmates were beaten and their keys
taken (31 I). The rebellion snowballed from this scene with the inmates taking the common
area between the four blocks, the result of a defective lock. The rebellions's participants then
spread through the rest of the prison, taking fifty hostages (311 ). By early afternoon, prison
authorities were able to regain control of part of the prison, but the convicts had control of
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most of the prison's resources. An initial attempt by the inmates toward negotiation was
rejected by Mancusi (312).
Leadership quickly formed among the ranks of the inmates as blocks nominated
leaders, hostages were assigned inmate guards, lookouts were chosen and placed, food and
clean-up details were organized, and a negotiating committee was nominated. (312). These
actions formed a "rough social order" under which the inmates were to function for the next
several days (Clines 44).
In the opposite camp, the authorities organized their resources as well. Commissioner
Oswald arrived at Attica around 2:00pm the same afternoon, and soon thereafter allowed a
law professor and a black Buffalo assemblyman into negotiations with the inmates. There the
men received the demands of the prisoners and a list of observers requested to be present at
the negotiations. ( 44) The purpose of these observers was to lend outside support to the
prisoners' requests by individuals including Huey P. Nev,/ton of the Black Panthers, Minister
Louis Farrakhan of the Muslim Mosque in Harlem, William M. Kunstler a civil rights lawyer,
and media groups (44). No concessions were made by either party toward negotiation.
Further rounds of negotiation between the authorities and the inmates continued through the
day, attended by different members of the administration and media sources. The results of
these talks were concessions granted to the inmates by Oswald and an injunction against
administrative and physical reprisals which was presented to the inmates on Friday morning
(Wicker 312).

However, the inmates refused the injunction, claiming that it was inadequate

for their needs (Clines 44). Learning of this response, Oswald refused any further direct
contact with the inmates.
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Throughout the remainder of Friday, Saturday, and Sunday the relations between the
administration and the inmates continued with little change. Observers checked the status of
the hostages on occasion and the administration continued to work on meeting the demands of
the inmates referred to as the 28 Points. In addition, they attempted to influence Governor
Rockefeller's aid. present at the prison, to advise him to come to Attica (Wicker 313). These
appeals were repeated throughout the day Sunday until Rockefeller made a public refusal.
Finally, the 28 point proposal was presented to the inmates on Saturday evening. They again
rejected the efforts of the authorities. This rejection of the 28 points by the inmates signaled
the end of peaceful efforts by authorities. State police marksmen and attack units then
assembled in the controlled blocks positioning for attack. At the shut-off of power and the
use of gas on the prisoners, marksmen fired and the attack began (314). Several minutes later
the attacks stopped. The results of the confrontation yielded 39 deaths and 91 wounded. Ten
hostages and 29 inmates were killed by the authorities in the attack, while only two hostages
were seriously injured by the inmates.

Analysis
On Helsel's "Scale of Crisis Magnitude," the events of the Attica State Correctional
Facility were classified as a Type IV crisis, plotting the event between a regional and a
national level, y-axis against death, x-axis. As the Helsel model was proved inaccurate and
unusable in this investigation, Attica will be measured on the Trudel model in order to
understand how these events progressed, culminated, and resolved. To accomplish this intent,
this event will be indexed in both capacities of the Trudel model: that which allows
understanding the implications and circumstances of one crisis and that which plots several

crises for comparison.
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Using the model to measure a single crisis, the events of this rebellion have been
broken down into nine facets, or things which impact the progression of events in this
situation. They are represented by X 0 through X� on the Trudel model. [Figure �] For the
purpose of clarity, these facets will be explained in terms of the event(s) they represent and in
terms of their positioning on the model. Also, positions of the points will sometimes be
expressed as a percentage of a distance in order to give a point of reference for the reader.
X 0 represents the starting point for the activity at Attica on the Trudel model. This
point does not represent Attica in stasis because normalcy is omitted in the measurement of
the x-axis on this model. Thus, unrest is occurring in the prison at this time. On the model,
X., is located approximately 25% up the y-axis and approximately 25¾ up the x-axis. They
axis location, demonstrating a large internal CSC and a very small external CSC, illustrates
that the inmate unrest is under the control of Attica prison authorities, with little or no
external intervention. The x-axis position of this point shows that this situation is a threat to
stasis, but that is still in the stages of a conventional incident. The X 1 , position shifts
however with the involvement of a control source, external to the Attica community, in the
prison environment. The result of this shift is position X 1•
Unhappy in their circumstances, a group of Attica inmates calling themselves the
''Attica Liberation Faction" sent a petition to Commissioner Oswald. The prisoners are
unhappy with conditions and treatment. They feel that the prison is overcrowded and that
facilities are inadequate. With the appeal to New York's Commissioner of Correctional
Services, Oswald, the prisoners introduce the external influence of Oswald into their situation
which continues through a time period of fruitless correspondence. On the model, X 1 is
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located above X 0 about two-thirds of the way up the y-axis and approximately 30% along the
x-axis. The y-axis position, demonstrating a moderate external CSC and a smaller internal
CSC, illustrates the increased external influence in this situation. As the Commissioner of
Correctional Services for the state of New York, Oswald has a large amount of power over
Attica. Thus, the prisoners are appealing to this external influence on their current
circumstances to produce positive results. The x-axis location for this point shifts right from

the X 0 position. This occurs because the appeals and ensuing correspondence with Oswald by
the inmates increases the concerns of the administrators, and produces increasing tensions
between the authorities and the inmates as changes do not result from the inmates' appeals.
The balance of control centers and the nature of threat shifts again, moving from the
X I to the X� position as a misunderstanding by a prison guard results in defiance of authority
by inmates. Specifically, the inmate applied physical force against the guard which was
quelled at the moment and dealt with later that evening. This contained rebellion by the
inmates functioned to widen the gap between the guards and the inmates. X: is positioned
about I oo,� of the way up the y-axis and approximately half way along the x-axis. This
position is down and right of the X 1 position. The y-axis coordinate possesses a strong
internal CSC and a weak external CSC. This occurs as this incident is solely between
members of the Attica community; it is internal to the prison. Oswald, although a player in
the agitation of the inmates, has no role in these events. The x-axis coordinate is again
located to the right of the X 1 position. The increased assertiveness of the inmates, shows
their increased agitation, heightening the degree/nature of threat to the situation.
With the increased tension on both sides, the next positional shift in this situation
occurs as the inmates overpower the guards accompanying them from the mess to the cell

Jo
block.

This incident, represented by the shift from

X2

to

X3,

sparks the actions of the

inmates to spread throughout the rest of the cell blocks, overpowering the prison_ In this
chaos, the inmates take fifty hostages. On the model, X, is located approximately 10%) of the
way up the y-axis, and three-fourths of the way along the x-axis. Like the X: y-coordinate,
the X 3 point has a high internal CSC and a low external CSC. This again derives from the
internal nature of the revolt; it involved only Attica authorities and inmates. The x-axis
similarly, again shifts right. This shift occurs as the actions on the part of the guards and the
inmates escalated to unchecked violence. The inmates knocked the Lieutenant in charge
unconscious, and beat the other guards with them and took their keys

In addition, hostages

were taken. Both of these incidents pose a severe threat to life.
Having passed the point of a conventional incident at a point during the last three
shifts, the activity at Attica is now in a crisis state. A shift occurs in this state as Oswald
once again exerts control over the situation at Attica. This moves the focus of the events
from a position at X 1 to one at X 4_ On the model, X 4 locates approximately two-thirds up the
y-axis and three-fourths along the x-axis_ This is a movement directly upward from X,,
signifying the increase in external CSC and the decrease in internal CSC. The significance of
this y-axis vertical shift is that it is at this point that negotiation begins between the
authorities and the inmates

Previously, Mancusi, Attica's Superintendent, had rejected efforts

by the inmates to negotiate. Oswald, however not only proceeded to communicate, but sent
in a law Professor and a Buffalo assemblyman. Thus, the threat to 1 ife, x-axis, does not
change, but the involvement of external forces on internal controls.
An upward shift occurs again with no horizontal movement with the inclusion of
media and observers in the authority/inmate negotiations. These involvements move X 4 to the

X5

position on the model. This coordinate shows a very high external CSC on the y•axis.

The y•axis position illustrates the Attica scenario here as the negotiations with the inmates are
primarily facilitated by Oswald. At this point in negotiation, the authorities have received the
demands of the convicts which include a request for a specific list of observers to be present.
In addition to the media. these observers are a means through which the inmates hope to gain
validity for their claims and a positive change to their environment. Both of these groups are
forces outside of Attica, and thus external CSCs. As before though, the x•axis coordinate
does not shift as no means are reached to reduce the threat to life. These factors then define
the vertical but not horizontal movement.
The X_, position again shifts vertically, as yet another external factor is added to this
situation. This external intervention occurs though the appeal by the observers to the
governor of the state of New York, Governor Rockefeller. Although intervention by
Rockefeller in the Attica scenario does not occur, the active appeal of the observers and
Rockefeller's aids to him signifies the level of external influence that Attica officials felt
necessary in order to control the inmate rebellion. On the model, the appeal to Rockefeller
moves the focus of control from position X, to X r,· X., locates where the y•axis is at its
highest degree of external CSC and at the lowest internal CSC and where the x•axis position
is again three.fourths down the x•axis. As before, the high degree of CSC does not reduce
the nature of threat in this situation, which is a serious threat to life.
Because intervention by external forces failed to produce the positive results which
both the inmates and authorities of Attica anticipated, the authorities of Attica, in
collaboration with external factions, act against the inmates to end the rebellion. These
actions move the focus on the model from the X <, location to the X 7 point, down and right of
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X 6. This repositions the y-axis coordinate at a position approximately two-thirds of the way
up the continuum where the external CSC still exceeds the internal CSC. The x-axis
coordinate extends to the end of the continuum as loss of life occurs. In this move, the

authorities retake Attica by force with loss of life to both inmates and hostages. Both Attica
authorities and external factions, including Oswald, participated in the decision for this action.
Finally, the focal point shifts back to the X 0 position described as X $ . Here the actions
experienced in X 7 put the center of control back into internal control and reduce the threat to
life back to a threat to normalcy/stasis. Complete normalcy is not yet restored here as the
consequences of the actions for the prisoners are not resolved.
The second capacity of the Trudel model is to show relationships of several crises. In
this instance, only Attica will be plotted on the model, but the point which the Attica riots
represent, demonstrates a different analysis process from the above application.
To plot Attica as one dynamic point on the Trudel model requires two considerations;
where does the overall situation fall on the CSC continuum and what is the overall
Degree/Nature of Threat for the situation. To determine Attica's CSC, the amount of external
CSC versus internal CSC was examined. In this situation, external influence played a vital
role m this situation, through appeals by the inmates and negotiation intervention. Oppositely,
internal inf1 uences contributed largely to the actual riots in the prison because of adverse
living conditions. Considering these factors, Attica places approximately two-thirds up along
the y-axis. [Figure 6] This placement allows for the influence of both parties, but a stronger
external CSC.
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Deciding the x-axis coordinate requires similar consideration. From the beginning of
the inmates' appeal to Commissioner Oswald, the Attica environment deviated from stasis,
placing the situation on the left end of the continuum. The ensuing events created a larger
and larger threat to the lives of parties involved including hostages, inmates, and other
authorities. Therefore, because the threat to life and eventual !oss of life plays a primary role
in this situation, the x-axis coordinate ultimately places at the far right end of the continuum.
Surrounding the Attica plot on the model is a spiral. This spiral represents the
dynamic nature of this occurrence. Thus, the point of location for Attica on the graph is not a
fixed position, but

a spot which approximates the area most suited for this situation.

The implications of the Trudel model for the field of Leadership Studies, is to provide
an instrument in which leaders can understand a situation in order to take proactive measures
to control it. For example, in the Attica Case if authorities could have plotted the events of
the riots on a scale such as the Trudel model, they would have seen that their actions were
pushing the inmates away from the desired internal focus (y-axis), and normalcy (x-axis).
Seeing where events stood versus where they intended them to be would allow leaders to take
actions to move events out of crisis situations back into a state of stasis. This use might have
produced more proactive leadership by Attica authorities, changing the ultimate outcome of
the situation.

CONCLUSION

Crisis is a dynamic phenomenon which exists throughout our societies and enters into
many facets of our lives. Often times, leaders arise out of these crisis states, directing us

'lo

though periods of threat, discomfort, and change. Surprisingly, research for this field does not
directly parallel the seemingly large occurrence of these events in our environments. Because
of this limited scope of research and the large scale of occurrence, this examination was
undertaken to broaden our knowledge of crisis and to understand the impact that this
phenomenon makes on leadership studies
To accomplish this intent, this investigation evaluated one aspect of crisis study, the
Helsel "Scale of Crisis Magnitude." This model compared the actual/potential number of
persons affected by a crisis situation to the degree of actual or potential negativity of a
situation. Through testing by two means, an internal evaluation comparing the visual
depiction to the written explanation, and an external evaluation comparing the conceptual
framework to the model, Helsel's model was found inaccurate and unusable. However, data
from this analysis as well as the conceptual framework, provided the groundwork and
ideology on which the Trudel model is based. This model is intended for use i.n all fields and
by all people through its simplicity and ability to span contexts. Ideally, it can encompass
personal crisis ranging to organizational and world crisis
In addition to differences in structure and specific measurements, a main difference
between the Helsel and Trudel models is the use of perspective

For the Trudel model,

perspective is a strength. In one capacity, for example, a leader can apply the model to their
own situation. In addition, an outside force (i.e. a consultant) can apply the model to the
same events. Comparing the two situational measurements allows the leader to understand
not only what is happening or potentially happening with the situation, but how this event is
viewed externally. Proactive measure can then be taken to improve upon the situation. Thus,
for the Trudel model, perspective plays a vital role for both leadership and crisis research

'II
functions.
Ideally. the Trudel model requires testing by several other examples, or by the plotting
of the same example by several different individuals due to its dynamic nature and its
dependency on perspective. This testing would demonstrate the feasibility of this model in an
actual crisis situation. However, at this time, new proposals have been made which change
the structure and to some degree the measurements of this index. Specifically, it is under
determination whether the index should have four axis (top, bottom, left, and right). The right
axis would measure the CSC of the environmental factors of the crisis. The top axis would
tentatively measure the stages of crisis. Also suggested, are the addition of point of reference
guidelines along each axis of the current model (i.e. degree markers ranging from one to ten)
to expedite and simplify the designation of coordinates. Because of the uncertainty of these
measurements, and the implications of these changes on the current model, these
modifications and thus testing will await further research.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A

Chronology of Events

Tu/y, 1971 Commissioner Oswald receives petition from Attica Liber
ation Faction.
;at., Aug. 21 George J:ickson dies, supposedly shot while attempting
esc:ipe frorn San Quentin prison.
mt., Aug. :n

Anica inmates fost and hold a silent protest at breakfast.

'hurs., Sept.

� Oswald confers with Attica Superintendent l\1a11cc:i
and prisoner representative Lott over July petition. In a tape
recorded message to the inmates t Oswald promises that changes
will be made evenruallv.

'ed., Sept. 8
45 P • .\1. Inmates Dew·er and Lamorie defv Corrections Officer
J\fr1ronc,· and are ordered to solitary confinement in Housing
BlockZ:
0
TF.R m;,;;,;rn \Vhen Dewer and Lamorie are taken to HBZ Cor
rections Officer Bo�·le is hit in the face with a soup can reputedly
thrown by \Villiam Ortiz.

•urs., Sept. 9

o .',.,.\!. Ortiz is liberated from his cell by other inmates to go to
breakfast.
During breakfast, authorities discover that Ortiz is absent from
his cell. Five Company is ordered back to its cells.
5 A.M. Lr. Curtiss approaches Five Company in A-tunnel to effect
this. Curtiss is knocked unconscious and other guards are beaten,
their keys taken. The intraprison phone is ripped from the wall.
A,M. A defective bolt in the gate at Times Square gives way
under the pressure of a group of inmate<; and the rebellion
spreads through the prison. Quinn, the guard on duty there,
sustains serious skull fractures. Fifty hostages are taken.
MORNZ'.':G Hostages a.re protected, in particular by Black Mus
lims. Roger Champen begins to organize inmates in D-yard.
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Chronology of Events

EARLY AFTERNOON Authorities regain control of pa rt of the prison.
Mancusi alienates inmates in a negotiation attem pt at No Man's
Land.

Inmates a ppoint lookouts and guards for hostages, ration ca p
ttJCed food, organize clean-u p details, and nominate a negotia
_ting team.
2 : 00 P.M. Commissioner Oswald arrives at Attica.
3 : 00, P�M. Schwa rtz and New York State Assembl y man Eve arrive
in D-y ard a nd are presented with the Five Demands and a list
of persons to he invited as observers of the negotiations.
4: 45-5 : r 5 P.M. Oswald, Sch wartz, and Eve confer with inmates in
D-yard.

Oswald is advised by state p olice that sufficient force is p resent
to retake the institution.
5-6
:
44 P.M. Oswald returns to D-y ard with New York Times,
:
5 4
Buffalo news pa p er, radio, and TV re porters. Inmates p resent the
Fifteen Practical Pro po'.:als.
:
30
P.M.
Assistant CommissiJner Dunbar, Assembl yman Emery, Eve,
7
and Schwartz enter D-yard and are asked for a federal court
in j unction against administrative and phy sic:1l re p ris:1ls.
Cham pen, Oswald, and Schwartz draft the inj unction outside
of 0-yard.
r r :30 P.M. Schwartz leaves to ohtain injunction.

Fri., Sept.

10

8: 3 0 A. M. Schwartz returns with the inj unction from Federal Jud ge
Curtin. It is rejected by inmates.
1 1 : 2 5 A.M. Oswald enters D- y ard. 1hc in junction is rorn n p b y
Rosenberg. Oswald decides that he w i l l 110 lon ger negotiate
directly with the rebellin g inmates.
LATE AFTERNOON Observers contact D.A. J:tmcs but fa i l to obtain
amnesty gu:1 rantee.
EVENING Observers enter D- yard and inspect hostages.
At inmates' req uest, some observers inspect C-hlock.

Kunstler arrives in the Stewards' Room and tele phones Bobby
Seale of the Black Panther Party .
1 1 : 30 P.M. Observer� a gain enter D-yard. Inmates add dcm.rnds that
Mancusi and D r. Williams be ex pe lled from the Attica staff.
LATER Unex p lained noise from C-block prom pts fear of attack :1ml
"red alert" in D-y ard. Eve and Dunne ascertain that no re p ris:ils
are takin g place and return to D- yard with members of the
Fortune Society, In gram, and Ken y atta.

Cbronology of Eve11ts
Sat., Sept.

3 13

11

4: 30 A .., 1 . Observers leave D-vard.
The observers choose a� executive comm ittee from amon g their
numher.

\Vicker, Jones, :md Te pper visit D.A. James in \Varsaw in :in
attem pt to obta i n somethin g similar to nmncsty for the inmates.
r o : oo A.,",J James gi ':es them a statement that there· will be no prose
:
.
_
cutmns or v111d1ct1vc re p risals.
1 1 : oo A.M. O bservers who have left the prison have difficulty bei ng
readmitted.
I : oo P.M. Observers meet again. James' letter is not well received.
\\'ic � er p roposes that the executive committee should arrem pt
to winnow down the inmates' demands and that all others leave.
On l v si -.:: others leave, and thev :1re Jocked out.
4: 30 P. M. · Corrections Officer Qui�n dies.

Observers finish 2 8-point p:1cb ge and d ecide to wait for Scale
before p resenting it to the i n mates.
6: 30 J>.1, 1 . Scale sits in :1 c:ir outside the p rison for an hour and then
leaves, while Oswald and observers discuss h is a d mitta nce. State
p olice :i re sent ,1 ftcr h i m to rcci uest his presence.
8 : 3 0 P.J\t . SeJlc enters the Stewards' Room and refuses to endorse the
2 8 poi nts. Observers enter D- �·:1rd ro p resent the z8 p oint�. Some
observers leave u p on p resentin g the sheet of pa p er, but others,
u p on seein g the inmates' :rn gcr, make the decision to p resent the
points ora ll y .
The 2 8 p oints arc ri pped u p . Remainin g observers leave.

Stm., Scpt.
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J\ l oH N I N(; ,voman Jll;ma gin g :1 d i ner hecomcs h rstcrical over the
p resence of A rt h u r l•� vc.
H: 30 A. /\1 . Scale a rri ves at A ttica. Observers grou p again in Stewa rds'
Rorn n . Se:1 k w:i l l,s out.
r o: 50 A . \ 1 . The ol isc r n:rs trv to i n fl uence Governor Rockefeller's
rl" p rcscnr:n i vcs ro ·a d v ist' ·h im to come ro A ttica.
1 1 : 4 5 A . /1. 1 . The observers d r:1 ft am! com p lete a statcmcm to the p uhlic.
1 : 1 1 l'. M . Oswald a g ree, r h :it observers ma y enter D- y a nl at 3 : 00.
Observers rcl c p horH: l{ur.:kddlcr themselves, try in g without
sm-ces� to p nsu:1dc h im t o come to meet w ith them.
3 :45 l'./1.L A small g rou p of oh�r.:rvers enters D- y �r<l, followed later b y
hLi d: :m d Puerto Ricm me<l i :1 representatives. Hosta ges are
i nterviewed .
I n mates o flici:i l l \· rci cct the � 8 points. Tile_, , lc.1ve the next move
_
up to the cmrn n issioner.

J14
6: 17 P.M.

Chronolo!{y of Eve7lts

Rockefeller states publicly rliar he wilJ not come to Attica.
9: 2 6 P.M. Oswald meets with the observers, who plead for more
tirne.
ro: 35 P.�t. !he meeting breaks up. Nine observers agree to spend the
mght 10 the Stewards' Room.
MmNIG�T Oswald phones Rockefeller in a last attempt to persuade
him to come.

Mon., Sept.

- - -

Observers leave D-yard for the last time.
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6: 5 5 A.M. Observers learn that Oswald has broken contact with them.
8:oo A.M. Oswald presents inmate Clark with a final statement of his
position.
8: 30 A.M. Observers read a copy of Oswald's memorandum to Clark.
lnmates staU for time.

State police marksmen assemble unseen on the roofs and third
floors of A- and C-blocks.

Attack units assemble on first and second floors of A- and
C-blocks.
9:05 A,M Hostages are seen being led blindfolded to a walkway near
.'
Times Square, knives at their throats.
9: 30 A.M. Inmates' response to 28 pojnrs is negative.
Eleven corre�tions officers with weapons gather, ignorant of
_
orders, m a third-floor corridor.
9:43 A.M. The prison's power circuit is mrned off. A hclicopcer drops
CS ga� �n D-yard. Marksmen fire and attack begins.
9: 52 A.M. Fmng stops.
1 o: JO A.M. D- and C-blocks are cleared.
1 :40 P.M. Badillo, Eve, and Garcia are told by Oswald that, as elected
officials, they will be given a tour of the institution. All other
observers are requested to leave.
Afterwards The results of the carnage are tabulated and it becomes
known that two hostages were seriously injured by the inmates,
wl�ereas JO hostages and 29 inmates were killed by corrcctir-ns
officers and state troopers. Three hostages, 85 jnmates, and one
trooper were wounded.

- -

APPENDIX ONE

l

The Five Demands

!

To the people of America

The incident that has erupted here at Attica is not a result of
the dasrnrdly husbwacking of the two prisoners Sept. 8, 197 r bur of
the unmitigated oppression wrought by the racist administration net
work of the prison, thruughout the year.

WE. arc l\lEN! \Ve are nor beasrs :1nd do not intend to he
beaten or driven ;1s such. The entire prison populace has set forrh to
change forever the ruthless l>ruralization and disregard for the lives of
the prisoners here and throughout the United States. \Vhat has hap
pened here is but the sotmd before the fury of those who arc oppressed.

We will nor compromise on any terms except those that are
a
agreeable to us. \Ve c:1II upon all the conscientious citizens of Americ
of
lives
the
ns
to assist us in putting :m end to this situation that threate
nor only us, hut c:1ch and everyone of us as well.

reality
\Ve h:1ve set forth demands that will bring closer ro
ose to
p
ur
p
usdul
no
the demise of rhcsr prisons institutions that serve
loit
c:--p
and
the People of l\ 1 mricn, but to those who would cnshtvc
the people of J\1m:rica.

OUR 1)/:',lfANDS AIW SUCIJ:
1.

2.

any
\Ve w:inr complcrc :mmcsty, mc:rning freedom from
physical, mcnt,11 and legal reprisals.
con
\Ve want rmw, speedy :ind s:1fo transportation out of
y.
countr
stic
periali
lincmcm, to a non-im

inrer
3. \Ve d rn uu(l rh:ir rhc FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
ISJUR
L
ERA
FED
vc11c, so rhat we will lie under dirc<:t

DICTION.

